Wednesday, May 22, 2013
Sunday, May 5, 2013
CHUCK YEAGER: F-35 NOT THE RIGHT STUFF
"Chuck Yeager, the first pilot to break the sound barrier, had some trenchant comments on the $397 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter on his Twitter feed last week:
“I was asked my opinion about the F-35. It's a waste of money. Far too expensive. Give me an F-15 E -- less expensive, will do the job,” he Tweeted."
“I was asked my opinion about the F-35. It's a waste of money. Far too expensive. Give me an F-15 E -- less expensive, will do the job,” he Tweeted."
(reposted from From nextgov.com)
Wednesday, May 1, 2013
Questions for Leahy on the Air Force’s F-35 decision
(From VTDigger)
by James Marc Leas
Dear Sen. Leahy,
A shocking report about the F-35 basing decision in Burlington and Sen. Leahy appeared in the Boston Globe, “As jets seem bound for Vermont, questions of political influence arise,” by Bryan Bender, April 14, 2013. A Pentagon official told the reporter, “the base-selection process was deliberately ‘fudged’ by military brass so that Leahy’s home state would win.”
The Pentagon official further said, “Unfortunately Burlington was selected even before the scoring process began … I wish it wasn’t true, but unfortunately that is the way it is. The numbers were fudged for Burlington to come out on top.”
Sen. Leahy, the Globe reporter writes that in your emailed statement to him you “did not respond to allegations of political influence.” Not just Vermonters but all Americans deserve an answer now to the question posed in the article: Was political influence involved? Do you agree or not that important decisions, like this one, should be based strictly on the facts, without political influence?
The article explains how you have substantial political influence over Air Force decision-making: “Leahy, elected in 1974, is a powerful figure in the Senate. He is the longest-serving member and a senior member of the Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense, which exerts great control over how the Pentagon spends its budget.”
“While the Air Force was conducting its F-35 National Guard base evaluations, Leahy was simultaneously sponsoring successful legislation that significantly elevated the National Guard’s status within the military by making its top official a four-star general and giving it a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Could this little nugget mean something other than payback in place for a deal to push forward the trillion-dollar F-35 program with basing in Vermont?
We learn that, “as cochairman of the National Guard Caucus in the Senate, Leahy also is a prominent booster of the Guard and looks out for the Guard’s interests in Washington.”
Certainly, as a former prosecutor, wouldn’t you agree that the allegation by a Pentagon official of deliberate fudging by military brass is serious? Particularly in view of a trillion dollars of taxpayer money being involved in the F-35 program?
Just one problem: thousands of Vermonters are getting shafted. The Air Force says that nearly 3,000 homes will be in a zone the Air Force considers “unsuitable for residential use” if the F-35 is based in South Burlington. The Air Force says that F-16 noise already put 200 homes in that noise zone in South Burlington. Fifty-five of them have been demolished and the rest are awaiting demolition. We have firsthand experience here in South Burlington with the damage F-16s noise did to a whole neighborhood of affordable homes. Do you think, in the face of that destruction and a Pentagon official charging undue political influence, that the people here will allow thousands more homes to be put in that same noise zone?
The 8,000 Vermonters living in those 3,000 affordable homes in South Burlington, Burlington, Winooski and Williston expect you to look out for their interests in Washington. And not do anything that might sacrifice homeowners and renters living in our towns and our communities. Why would you continue to refuse to meet with any of these 8,000 if you were fighting to protect them?
Sure, I understand that developers — like Ernie Pomerleau, who is quoted in the article — may have much to gain personally as homes are demolished and land near the airport becomes available for commercial development. Can we expect you to protect thousands of Vermont homeowners and renters or not? Or will you put Ernie Pomerleau’s interests first? When thousands of homes and families are at severe risk from the noise zone and the crash zone of the F-35 — and from developers who may be seeking to use the noise zones to their own advantage?
Sen. Bernie Sanders told the Globe in a statement, “’I take seriously allegations that the scoring process may have been flawed’ … adding that the Air Force should release all of its documentation. ‘I do believe the process must be transparent and fair.’”
Certainly, as a former prosecutor, wouldn’t you agree that the allegation by a Pentagon official of deliberate fudging by military brass is serious? Particularly in view of a trillion dollars of taxpayer money being involved in the F-35 program? And the possibility that certain developers here in Vermont can personally gain while thousands of homeowners and renters stand to lose their affordable homes in Burlington, Winooski, South Burlington and Williston? Wouldn’t you agree that an impartial, transparent and independent investigation of these allegations is needed? Wouldn’t you agree that if wrongdoing by military brass is found by that investigation, the officials responsible should be prosecuted?
In view of the allegation in this Globe article by a Pentagon official that “the base-selection process was deliberately ‘fudged’ by military brass so that Leahy’s home state would win,” that “the numbers were fudged for Burlington to come out on top,” and that certain developers, including Ernie Pomerleau, are positioned to personally gain while thousands of families lose their homes, will you immediately ask the Air Force to stop considering Burlington for the first basing round, as recommended by 15 members of the Burlington area clergy? Such a solution will enable the Air Force to start its process over again, publish all its scoring sheets, and base its selection strictly on the facts. And without regard to any political influence that may have been applied.
Dear Sen. Leahy,
A shocking report about the F-35 basing decision in Burlington and Sen. Leahy appeared in the Boston Globe, “As jets seem bound for Vermont, questions of political influence arise,” by Bryan Bender, April 14, 2013. A Pentagon official told the reporter, “the base-selection process was deliberately ‘fudged’ by military brass so that Leahy’s home state would win.”
The Pentagon official further said, “Unfortunately Burlington was selected even before the scoring process began … I wish it wasn’t true, but unfortunately that is the way it is. The numbers were fudged for Burlington to come out on top.”
Sen. Leahy, the Globe reporter writes that in your emailed statement to him you “did not respond to allegations of political influence.” Not just Vermonters but all Americans deserve an answer now to the question posed in the article: Was political influence involved? Do you agree or not that important decisions, like this one, should be based strictly on the facts, without political influence?
The article explains how you have substantial political influence over Air Force decision-making: “Leahy, elected in 1974, is a powerful figure in the Senate. He is the longest-serving member and a senior member of the Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense, which exerts great control over how the Pentagon spends its budget.”
“While the Air Force was conducting its F-35 National Guard base evaluations, Leahy was simultaneously sponsoring successful legislation that significantly elevated the National Guard’s status within the military by making its top official a four-star general and giving it a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Could this little nugget mean something other than payback in place for a deal to push forward the trillion-dollar F-35 program with basing in Vermont?
We learn that, “as cochairman of the National Guard Caucus in the Senate, Leahy also is a prominent booster of the Guard and looks out for the Guard’s interests in Washington.”
Certainly, as a former prosecutor, wouldn’t you agree that the allegation by a Pentagon official of deliberate fudging by military brass is serious? Particularly in view of a trillion dollars of taxpayer money being involved in the F-35 program?
Just one problem: thousands of Vermonters are getting shafted. The Air Force says that nearly 3,000 homes will be in a zone the Air Force considers “unsuitable for residential use” if the F-35 is based in South Burlington. The Air Force says that F-16 noise already put 200 homes in that noise zone in South Burlington. Fifty-five of them have been demolished and the rest are awaiting demolition. We have firsthand experience here in South Burlington with the damage F-16s noise did to a whole neighborhood of affordable homes. Do you think, in the face of that destruction and a Pentagon official charging undue political influence, that the people here will allow thousands more homes to be put in that same noise zone?
The 8,000 Vermonters living in those 3,000 affordable homes in South Burlington, Burlington, Winooski and Williston expect you to look out for their interests in Washington. And not do anything that might sacrifice homeowners and renters living in our towns and our communities. Why would you continue to refuse to meet with any of these 8,000 if you were fighting to protect them?
Sure, I understand that developers — like Ernie Pomerleau, who is quoted in the article — may have much to gain personally as homes are demolished and land near the airport becomes available for commercial development. Can we expect you to protect thousands of Vermont homeowners and renters or not? Or will you put Ernie Pomerleau’s interests first? When thousands of homes and families are at severe risk from the noise zone and the crash zone of the F-35 — and from developers who may be seeking to use the noise zones to their own advantage?
Sen. Bernie Sanders told the Globe in a statement, “’I take seriously allegations that the scoring process may have been flawed’ … adding that the Air Force should release all of its documentation. ‘I do believe the process must be transparent and fair.’”
Certainly, as a former prosecutor, wouldn’t you agree that the allegation by a Pentagon official of deliberate fudging by military brass is serious? Particularly in view of a trillion dollars of taxpayer money being involved in the F-35 program? And the possibility that certain developers here in Vermont can personally gain while thousands of homeowners and renters stand to lose their affordable homes in Burlington, Winooski, South Burlington and Williston? Wouldn’t you agree that an impartial, transparent and independent investigation of these allegations is needed? Wouldn’t you agree that if wrongdoing by military brass is found by that investigation, the officials responsible should be prosecuted?
In view of the allegation in this Globe article by a Pentagon official that “the base-selection process was deliberately ‘fudged’ by military brass so that Leahy’s home state would win,” that “the numbers were fudged for Burlington to come out on top,” and that certain developers, including Ernie Pomerleau, are positioned to personally gain while thousands of families lose their homes, will you immediately ask the Air Force to stop considering Burlington for the first basing round, as recommended by 15 members of the Burlington area clergy? Such a solution will enable the Air Force to start its process over again, publish all its scoring sheets, and base its selection strictly on the facts. And without regard to any political influence that may have been applied.
Monday, April 29, 2013
If Pork Could Fly
Vermont F-35 Base Called Political Pork for Senior Democratic Senator
By William Boardman panthers007@comcast.net
What Happens When You Get Too Invested in a Disaster?
While it’s too soon, perhaps, to say that the over-budget, overdue, and under-performing F-35 joint strike fighter is in a political tailspin, having its biggest Senate booster accused of pushing for political pork at the expense of his poorer constituents hasn’t made the controversial stealth bomber’s flight path less bumpy.
According to the Boston Globe, the Air Force “fudged” its assessment of the Vermont Air National Guard Base in Burlington, Vermont, in order to give Vermont’s senior Senator, Patrick Leahy, D-VT, a political plum that could not be justified on its merits. Despite three years growing local opposition to basing an F-35 squadron of nuclear-capable stealth bombers in Vermont’s most densely populated area, Leahy has spent more years cheerleading the Air Force plan while at the same time refusing to meet with his unhappy constituents.
The Air Force first planned to announce its final Burlington basing decision in the fall of 2012, then pushed it back to the winter of 2013, and then to the spring. On April 18, four days after the Globe story went largely unrebutted, the Air Force announced that the decision would not be made until the fall and that there would be yet another public comment period during the summer.
Sen. Leahy, 73, who is legally blind in one eye, did not serve in the military. He is co-chair of the Senate’s National Guard Caucus, which has 88 members.
F-35 Getting Too, Late, Too Expensive, and Too Dysfunctional?
Outside of Vermont, the F-35 program continues to struggle in more basic ways. Its cost is already 100% over budget, having cost more than $400 billion since 2001, with the plane still in the testing phase. Technical problems have grounded it for extended periods this year. And foreign buyers, having planned on a $70 million plane, are reducing or cancelling orders as the cost has risen above $200 million each (although DefenseWorld.net reported that the U.S. offered F-35s to South Korea at a discounted price of $180 million).
Whether the Air Force decided to delay its F-35 basing decision due to the Globe’s allegations against Sen. Leahy is presently unknown, but the Senator has supported basing the F-35 at the Burlington Airport since long before the Air Force made Burlington one of its top basing candidates.
And Sen. Leahy has remained adamantly in support of the Air Force plan as it has become increasingly controversial over the past three years. He has consistently defended the F-35 while refusing to respond substantively to its associated problems, including excess noise, loss of property value, human health impairment, and environmental degradation.
No One Has Said Senator Leahy Has Dome Anything Illegal
The charges against Sen. Leahy, made in a front page story in the Boston Globe April 14, are not charges of criminality, but rather of the familiar political corruption that passes for business-as-usual in Washington. In response, Leahy issued a brief non-denial denial, saying dishonestly:
“The Air Force selected the Vermont Guard as its preferred choice for the F-35s on the merits, based on the Vermont Air Guard’s unsurpassed record, its top-flight personnel and facilities, and its strategic location. Vague, anonymous, uninformed and rehashed conspiracy theories cannot change those facts.”
Elements of dishonesty in this statement include:
The first sentence blurs the distinction between selecting the Vermont Air Guard as the first Guard unit to have the F-35, and the basing decision not yet made with regard to the Burlington Airport. That decision will at least purport to be based on other criteria entirely, include those in the environmental impact statement that assesses social, environmental, and health issues, among others.
The case for a “strategic location,” in northern Vermont, next to the Canadian border, has yet to be made. Leahy and others typically praise the Air Guard for “its voluntary and near-constant response to the 9/11 attacks for 122 consecutive days.” While true, this omits the reality that the Air Guard responded only after the attacks. Earlier, when one of the hijacked airliners came up the Hudson Valley near Vermont, the F-16s in Burlington sat on the ground.
“Vague” is just false. The critiques of the Air Force plans have been detailed and precise, whether presented by a former Pentagon planner, lawyers, reporters, or others. Leahy’s responses, when he has responded, have mostly been as vague as this one.
“Anonymous_ -- while the Globe story refers to two or more anonymous sources, it also quotes acting assistant secretary of the Air Force Kathy Ferguson and Air Force chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh III, both of whom acknowledge fact and processes errors that the Air Force needed to correct.
“Uninformed” is almost laughable, since the most germane critiques of the basing proposal are derived from information provided by the Air Force in its environmental impact statement of March 2012, which is currently in the process of being finalized (a necessary element of the basing decision).
“Rehashed conspiracy theories” is a wing nut straw man argument, since the core arguments against the F-35 require no conspiracies to be correct. All they require is bad judgment of one sort or another.
Taken as a whole, Leahy’s statement actually means nothing. Although it’s constructed to push emotional buttons that could distract the casual reader from its emptiness, the careful reader will notice that it lacks relevant content.
The Record Opposing the F-35 in Vermont is Long and Detailed
Those who oppose basing the F-35 in a densely populated argue that that’s just a bad decision -- as public policy, economic policy, military policy, or environmental policy. Their arguments largely go unanswered by any rational counter-argument.
In responding to the Globe story, the Senator’s office circulated a dozen or so supporting documents of limited relevance as well as one that outlines several basic issues to which Leahy apparently never responded substantively.
In February 2010, the chair of the South Burlington City Council, Mark Boucher, wrote to the Air Force, with copies to Leahy, Senator Bernie Sanders, Congressman Peter Welch, Gov. Jim Douglas, and others involved then in the F-35 planning process. Among other things, Boucher noted that the Burlington International Airport (BIA) was confined entirely within the borders of South Burlington, but that South Burlington had not even been informed of meetings of the interested parties, never mind invited to take part in a process whose impact would be felt most directly by South Burlington.
Boucher noted that: “For the last several years, the BIA has been purchasing and removing homes adjacent to the Airport using federal FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] noise mitigation funding.”
He discussed the impact of the “unfit for residential use” zone on city housing, putting more than 150 homes at risk. He described the area as comprising “the largest inventory of affordable housing in South Burlington.” (The 2012 Air Force environmental impact statement says that a minimum of 1,300 homes will become “unfit for residential use” as a result of the smaller of two F-35 basing plans.)
Do Their Elected Representatives Care Where or How People Live?
Anticipating the impact of an F-35 base in South Burlington, Boucher said in his 2010 letter:
“The City strongly opposes the loss of additional housing, especially without the replacement of similar housing…. The BIA is not only located in a residential neighborhood, but within close proximity to a neighborhood elementary school and a land development designed to be a new downtown for South Burlington.”
No high elected official in Vermont – not Sens. Leahy or Sanders, not Rep. Welch, not Gov. Douglas or his successor, Gov. Peter Shumlin, has even responded to this concern for people to have the peaceable enjoyment of their homes, much less has any of them proposed even the slightest solution.
By contrast, the Air Force at least acknowledges the issue and scores Burlington low for “environmental justice” because of “disproportionate effects on minority and low income individuals.” In other words, the Air Force acknowledges that the disadvantaged would once again be forced to subsidize the advantaged with their property or quality of life, or both. But the Vermont officials who are supposed to represent them do nothing.
There is no indication that anyone, including the Air Force, responded to council chair Boucher’s letter. Over two months later, in May 2010, Leahy followed up with the Air Force, beginning by assuring them that “I have long supported the Vermont Air National Guard and as a Vermonter am proud that the Air Force has selected Burlington….”
Lacking a Good Argument, Try Chasing a Chimera or a Shibboleth
In the fourth paragraph of his letter, Leahy gets around to expressing “my support for Councilman Boucher’s recommendations for future communications,...” without expressing support for anything specific. Then he adds:
“There has been a lot of information – and unfortunately, some rumors – circulating on websites and in the community about the F-35. Certainly, the more the Air Force can do to reach out to residents, businesses, and local officials to set the record straight and have a reasonable discussion about the facts, the more satisfied everyone will be with the process.”
The Senator does not give any further indication of what he thinks was not factual, and his own website does not offer any clarification of what he’s now apparently calling “vague, anonymous, uninformed and rehashed conspiracy theories.” In this respect, he’s no different from Sanders, Welch, Douglas, or Shumlim, although Shumlin made a show in the fall of 2010 of junketing to Florida to listen with ear muffs on to the F-35 taking off – he said it wasn’t as loud as he’d expected.
None of these elected leaders have requested an obvious, straight-forward, transparent idea – or even supported it three years ago when Council chair Boucher proposed it: “We request that the Air Force bring an operational F-35A to BIA so residents can judge the noise at landing and take-off for themselves…. I also believe such a visit would be quite popular.”
There is no indication the Air Force ever responded to this request.
Maybe the Question Should Be: Who Gets Hurt if There’s No F-35 Base?
More characteristic of the Air Force practice in this process is that it continues to withhold scoring sheets on which it based its original evaluation of Burlington Airport. While the Air Force has admitted some errors in the scoring, it has stonewalled any opportunity for an outside review.
Among the most active supporters of basing the F-35 in Vermont is a Burlington real estate mogul Ernie Pomerleau, whose firm is one of several that promoted a specious study by the Greater Burlington Industrial Corp., that argued that that the F-35 base would have no significant financial impact on homeowners near the airport in South Burlington.
Speculation in Vermont is that the Pomerleaus and other real estate interests stand to gain directly from depopulating the area around the airport and turning it into a commercial zone for an expanded airport. Pomerleaus are among Leahy’s in-laws.
Senator Sanders, whose support for the F-35 has often been more gingerly than Leahy’s, had this quote in a news item on his website on April 20:
"I’m not sure how accurate the Boston Globe's article really was raising questions about Sen. Leahy’s role. I think he has denied that and I think he’s right. So I don’t agree with the basic tenet of the article. On the other hand I do believe that what we have always wanted is as much input as possible. We are a state where we think people have a right to be heard.”
That doesn’t sound like wagons that are circling.
Update: On April 24, opponents of the F-35 called a press conference in front of Leahy’s office in Burlington. The speakers included a grandmother who has lived next to the airport for 40 years and Ben Cohen, the co-founder of Ben&Jerry’s Ice Cream. Leahy staffers responded with insults conveyed to reporters.
Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News
By William Boardman panthers007@comcast.net
What Happens When You Get Too Invested in a Disaster?
While it’s too soon, perhaps, to say that the over-budget, overdue, and under-performing F-35 joint strike fighter is in a political tailspin, having its biggest Senate booster accused of pushing for political pork at the expense of his poorer constituents hasn’t made the controversial stealth bomber’s flight path less bumpy.
According to the Boston Globe, the Air Force “fudged” its assessment of the Vermont Air National Guard Base in Burlington, Vermont, in order to give Vermont’s senior Senator, Patrick Leahy, D-VT, a political plum that could not be justified on its merits. Despite three years growing local opposition to basing an F-35 squadron of nuclear-capable stealth bombers in Vermont’s most densely populated area, Leahy has spent more years cheerleading the Air Force plan while at the same time refusing to meet with his unhappy constituents.
The Air Force first planned to announce its final Burlington basing decision in the fall of 2012, then pushed it back to the winter of 2013, and then to the spring. On April 18, four days after the Globe story went largely unrebutted, the Air Force announced that the decision would not be made until the fall and that there would be yet another public comment period during the summer.
Sen. Leahy, 73, who is legally blind in one eye, did not serve in the military. He is co-chair of the Senate’s National Guard Caucus, which has 88 members.
F-35 Getting Too, Late, Too Expensive, and Too Dysfunctional?
Outside of Vermont, the F-35 program continues to struggle in more basic ways. Its cost is already 100% over budget, having cost more than $400 billion since 2001, with the plane still in the testing phase. Technical problems have grounded it for extended periods this year. And foreign buyers, having planned on a $70 million plane, are reducing or cancelling orders as the cost has risen above $200 million each (although DefenseWorld.net reported that the U.S. offered F-35s to South Korea at a discounted price of $180 million).
Whether the Air Force decided to delay its F-35 basing decision due to the Globe’s allegations against Sen. Leahy is presently unknown, but the Senator has supported basing the F-35 at the Burlington Airport since long before the Air Force made Burlington one of its top basing candidates.
And Sen. Leahy has remained adamantly in support of the Air Force plan as it has become increasingly controversial over the past three years. He has consistently defended the F-35 while refusing to respond substantively to its associated problems, including excess noise, loss of property value, human health impairment, and environmental degradation.
No One Has Said Senator Leahy Has Dome Anything Illegal
The charges against Sen. Leahy, made in a front page story in the Boston Globe April 14, are not charges of criminality, but rather of the familiar political corruption that passes for business-as-usual in Washington. In response, Leahy issued a brief non-denial denial, saying dishonestly:
“The Air Force selected the Vermont Guard as its preferred choice for the F-35s on the merits, based on the Vermont Air Guard’s unsurpassed record, its top-flight personnel and facilities, and its strategic location. Vague, anonymous, uninformed and rehashed conspiracy theories cannot change those facts.”
Elements of dishonesty in this statement include:
The first sentence blurs the distinction between selecting the Vermont Air Guard as the first Guard unit to have the F-35, and the basing decision not yet made with regard to the Burlington Airport. That decision will at least purport to be based on other criteria entirely, include those in the environmental impact statement that assesses social, environmental, and health issues, among others.
The case for a “strategic location,” in northern Vermont, next to the Canadian border, has yet to be made. Leahy and others typically praise the Air Guard for “its voluntary and near-constant response to the 9/11 attacks for 122 consecutive days.” While true, this omits the reality that the Air Guard responded only after the attacks. Earlier, when one of the hijacked airliners came up the Hudson Valley near Vermont, the F-16s in Burlington sat on the ground.
“Vague” is just false. The critiques of the Air Force plans have been detailed and precise, whether presented by a former Pentagon planner, lawyers, reporters, or others. Leahy’s responses, when he has responded, have mostly been as vague as this one.
“Anonymous_ -- while the Globe story refers to two or more anonymous sources, it also quotes acting assistant secretary of the Air Force Kathy Ferguson and Air Force chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh III, both of whom acknowledge fact and processes errors that the Air Force needed to correct.
“Uninformed” is almost laughable, since the most germane critiques of the basing proposal are derived from information provided by the Air Force in its environmental impact statement of March 2012, which is currently in the process of being finalized (a necessary element of the basing decision).
“Rehashed conspiracy theories” is a wing nut straw man argument, since the core arguments against the F-35 require no conspiracies to be correct. All they require is bad judgment of one sort or another.
Taken as a whole, Leahy’s statement actually means nothing. Although it’s constructed to push emotional buttons that could distract the casual reader from its emptiness, the careful reader will notice that it lacks relevant content.
The Record Opposing the F-35 in Vermont is Long and Detailed
Those who oppose basing the F-35 in a densely populated argue that that’s just a bad decision -- as public policy, economic policy, military policy, or environmental policy. Their arguments largely go unanswered by any rational counter-argument.
In responding to the Globe story, the Senator’s office circulated a dozen or so supporting documents of limited relevance as well as one that outlines several basic issues to which Leahy apparently never responded substantively.
In February 2010, the chair of the South Burlington City Council, Mark Boucher, wrote to the Air Force, with copies to Leahy, Senator Bernie Sanders, Congressman Peter Welch, Gov. Jim Douglas, and others involved then in the F-35 planning process. Among other things, Boucher noted that the Burlington International Airport (BIA) was confined entirely within the borders of South Burlington, but that South Burlington had not even been informed of meetings of the interested parties, never mind invited to take part in a process whose impact would be felt most directly by South Burlington.
Boucher noted that: “For the last several years, the BIA has been purchasing and removing homes adjacent to the Airport using federal FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] noise mitigation funding.”
He discussed the impact of the “unfit for residential use” zone on city housing, putting more than 150 homes at risk. He described the area as comprising “the largest inventory of affordable housing in South Burlington.” (The 2012 Air Force environmental impact statement says that a minimum of 1,300 homes will become “unfit for residential use” as a result of the smaller of two F-35 basing plans.)
Do Their Elected Representatives Care Where or How People Live?
Anticipating the impact of an F-35 base in South Burlington, Boucher said in his 2010 letter:
“The City strongly opposes the loss of additional housing, especially without the replacement of similar housing…. The BIA is not only located in a residential neighborhood, but within close proximity to a neighborhood elementary school and a land development designed to be a new downtown for South Burlington.”
No high elected official in Vermont – not Sens. Leahy or Sanders, not Rep. Welch, not Gov. Douglas or his successor, Gov. Peter Shumlin, has even responded to this concern for people to have the peaceable enjoyment of their homes, much less has any of them proposed even the slightest solution.
By contrast, the Air Force at least acknowledges the issue and scores Burlington low for “environmental justice” because of “disproportionate effects on minority and low income individuals.” In other words, the Air Force acknowledges that the disadvantaged would once again be forced to subsidize the advantaged with their property or quality of life, or both. But the Vermont officials who are supposed to represent them do nothing.
There is no indication that anyone, including the Air Force, responded to council chair Boucher’s letter. Over two months later, in May 2010, Leahy followed up with the Air Force, beginning by assuring them that “I have long supported the Vermont Air National Guard and as a Vermonter am proud that the Air Force has selected Burlington….”
Lacking a Good Argument, Try Chasing a Chimera or a Shibboleth
In the fourth paragraph of his letter, Leahy gets around to expressing “my support for Councilman Boucher’s recommendations for future communications,...” without expressing support for anything specific. Then he adds:
“There has been a lot of information – and unfortunately, some rumors – circulating on websites and in the community about the F-35. Certainly, the more the Air Force can do to reach out to residents, businesses, and local officials to set the record straight and have a reasonable discussion about the facts, the more satisfied everyone will be with the process.”
The Senator does not give any further indication of what he thinks was not factual, and his own website does not offer any clarification of what he’s now apparently calling “vague, anonymous, uninformed and rehashed conspiracy theories.” In this respect, he’s no different from Sanders, Welch, Douglas, or Shumlim, although Shumlin made a show in the fall of 2010 of junketing to Florida to listen with ear muffs on to the F-35 taking off – he said it wasn’t as loud as he’d expected.
None of these elected leaders have requested an obvious, straight-forward, transparent idea – or even supported it three years ago when Council chair Boucher proposed it: “We request that the Air Force bring an operational F-35A to BIA so residents can judge the noise at landing and take-off for themselves…. I also believe such a visit would be quite popular.”
There is no indication the Air Force ever responded to this request.
Maybe the Question Should Be: Who Gets Hurt if There’s No F-35 Base?
More characteristic of the Air Force practice in this process is that it continues to withhold scoring sheets on which it based its original evaluation of Burlington Airport. While the Air Force has admitted some errors in the scoring, it has stonewalled any opportunity for an outside review.
Among the most active supporters of basing the F-35 in Vermont is a Burlington real estate mogul Ernie Pomerleau, whose firm is one of several that promoted a specious study by the Greater Burlington Industrial Corp., that argued that that the F-35 base would have no significant financial impact on homeowners near the airport in South Burlington.
Speculation in Vermont is that the Pomerleaus and other real estate interests stand to gain directly from depopulating the area around the airport and turning it into a commercial zone for an expanded airport. Pomerleaus are among Leahy’s in-laws.
Senator Sanders, whose support for the F-35 has often been more gingerly than Leahy’s, had this quote in a news item on his website on April 20:
"I’m not sure how accurate the Boston Globe's article really was raising questions about Sen. Leahy’s role. I think he has denied that and I think he’s right. So I don’t agree with the basic tenet of the article. On the other hand I do believe that what we have always wanted is as much input as possible. We are a state where we think people have a right to be heard.”
That doesn’t sound like wagons that are circling.
Update: On April 24, opponents of the F-35 called a press conference in front of Leahy’s office in Burlington. The speakers included a grandmother who has lived next to the airport for 40 years and Ben Cohen, the co-founder of Ben&Jerry’s Ice Cream. Leahy staffers responded with insults conveyed to reporters.
Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News
Monday, April 15, 2013
They Fudged the Data: Stop the F-35 Planning Meeting, 4/16 @ 7:00 PM Winooski High School room #127
The rational provided by Senator Leahy to support the F-35 has been exposed by Brian Bender's article in yesterday's Boston Globe. It is an egregious example of the military/industrial/government complex to satisfy the greed and power of the 1%. The article is providing us with an amazing opportunity to complete our work to insure that the F-35 will not be based here in Burlington.
To follow-up on the Globe article, we will meet tomorrow night, Tues Apr 16 in the Winooski School rm 127. Please enter the building using the double doors on the north side of the building. This will be our only agenda item.
This is an exciting time. Please come. We need everyone's input and support.
4/16 @ 7:00 PM Winooski High School room #127 (Enter at double doors at the north of the school complex)
Saturday, March 16, 2013
FACED WITH F-35 FAILURES AND COSTS CONGRESS SAYS TO PUSH ON
By William Boardman
And the big fool says to push on.
Waist deep in the Big Muddy
And the big fool says to push on.
Waist deep! Neck deep! Soon even a
Tall man'll be over his head, we're
Waist deep in the Big Muddy!
And the big fool says to push on!
-Pete Seeger
According to one of its supporters, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is not “what our troops need,” is “too costly “ and “poorly managed,” and its “present difficulties are too numerous to detail….”
The F-35 is a case study of government failure at all levels – civilian and military, federal, state, local, even airport authority. Not one critical government agency is meeting its obligation to protect the people it presumably represents. Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT, who wrote the F-35 critique above, is hardly unique as an illustration of how government fails, but he sees no alternative to failure.
Up for re-election in 2014 and long a supporter of basing the F-35 in Vermont, Leahy put those thoughts in a [1]letter[1] to a constituent made public March 13. This is Leahy’s most recent public communication since December 2012, when he refused to meet with opponents of the F-35 and his [2]website[2] listed a page of “public discussion” events mostly from the spring, including private briefings with public officials, without responding to any substantive issues.
The F-35 is a nuclear-capable weapon of mass destruction that was supposed to be the “fighter of the future” when it was undertaken in 2001. Now, more than a decade overdue and more than 100% over budget, the plane is expected to cost $1.5 trillion over its useful life, of which about $400 billion has already been spent.
100TH F-35 BEING BUILT, NONE YET OPERATIONAL
In January, the Lockheed Martin production facility in Fort Worth, Texas, reported it was well along “in the final phase of building the wings” of the 100th F-35 constructed by the Bethesda, Maryland, [3]company[3]. Of the first 99 F-35s, none is yet operational.
The F-35 isn’t even close to fully operational – it can fly only on sunny days. It can’t fly at night. And it can’t fly in clouds or near lightning. We know this because the Pentagon tells us so, in a report written for the Secretary of Defense by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, dated February 15, 2013.
Although some media hyped the [4]report[4] as a “leaked document,” Gilmore clearly expected the report would become public, since he included a description of its wide distribution within the government, concluding with the reminder: “By law, I must provide Congress with any test-related material it requests.”
By March 5, Gilmore’s report was on the internet and giving the Canadian government second thoughts about buying the plane at all. Some 35 other countries are expected to by the F-35, and most of them are also having second thoughts – as is even the U.S. Leahy indicates in his letter that “the jet is too costly to proceed with purchases at today’s planned levels,” which are about 2,400 planes at a currently projected cost of $120 billion each, give or take $30 billion.
Gilmore’s report covers the F-35 training program at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida for two months in the fall of 2012, a program originally scheduled to begin in August 2011, but the F-35 wasn’t ready then. Even a year later, the training program “was limited by the current restrictions of the aircraft.” The program partially trained 4 pilots in 46 days.
IF THE PILOT CAN EJECT, HE’LL BE LUCKY NOT TO DROWN
The report’s executive summary gives a sense of what some of the “current restrictions” of the F-35 are:
* Aircraft operating limitations prohibit flying the aircraft at night or in instrument meteorological conditions, hence pilots must avoid clouds and other weather…. These restrictions are in place because testing has not been completed to certify the aircraft for night and instrument flight.
* The aircraft also is currently prohibited from flying close formation, aerobatics, and stalls, all of which would normally be in the familiarization phase of transition training….
* The F-35A does not yet have the capability to train in these phases, nor any actual combat capability, because it is still early in system development.
* Also, little can be learned from evaluating training in a system this immature….
The radar, the pilot’s helmet-mounted display (HMD), and the cockpit interfaces for controlling the radios and navigational functions should be improved.
The report also notes that the pilot escape system is not yet reliable, especially if a pilot were to eject over water.
On the blog of the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), Winslow Wheeler takes a closer [5]look[5] at the full report under the headline: “The Air Force’s F-35A: Not Ready for Combat, Not Even Ready for Combat Training.”
WHAT DO YOU EXPECT FOR $400 BILLION? SOMETHING THAT WORKS?
So for $400 billion (and counting), the U.S. has bought an “immature system,” a combat fighter still unfit for combat, a plane that has spent much of 2013 grounded for various malfunctions. The General Accounting Office (GOA) report issued this month offers good news of the it’s-not-as-bad-as-it-used-to-be kind, as in the finding that production costs are “trending” downwards toward targets.
The program continues to make design changes in the F-35 at the rate of about 200 per month, even as the plane continues in production, creating what amounts to a permanent process of retrofitting. The GAO projects that F-35 flight testing may be complete some time in 2017 and the plane might not be ready for combat before 2019.
No wonder the F-35 Program Executive Officer, Lt.-General Christopher Bogdan, has expressed dissatisfaction with the companies making the plane. The general, who has been with the program since July 2012 and became director in December, didn’t use the word “profiteering” to call out two major defense contractors for their shoddy-but-profitable performance on the F-35, but he [6]came[6] close:
"What I see Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney [subsidiary of United Technologies Corp.] doing today is behaving as if they are getting ready to sell me the very last F-35 and the very last engine and are trying to squeeze every nickel out of that last F-35 and that last engine…. I want them both to start behaving like they want to be around for 40 years, I want them to take on some of the risk of this program, I want them to invest in cost reductions, I want them to do the things that will build a better relationship. I'm not getting all that love yet."
CONGRESS ISN’T DOING ITS JOB IN THIS AREA, EITHER
Congressional oversight, which is intended to keep debacles like the F-35 from happening, has failed utterly. Instead, according to Leahy who, as the senior Democratic Senator, is the president pro tem of the Senate and third in the line of succession to the Presidency, leadership is no longer possible.
Like the rest of the Vermont Congressional delegation, which includes Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-VT, and Rep. Peter Welch, D-VT, Leahy has struck a pose of self-imposed helplessness when is comes to basing the world’s most expensive and not-yet-operational weapons system in the middle of Vermont’s only significant population center, suggesting that the decision is entirely up to the Air Force and civilian control of the military is an outmoded concept of some other America.
At present, the Air Force has twice postponed making a final decision as to whether the F-35 should be based at the Burlington (VT) International Airport, even though the Air Force’s own environmental report warns that the F-35 is four times as loud as current fighters in Burlington, and that this increase in noise is likely to render at lease 1,300 homes – and perhaps more than 3,000 homes -- “unsuitable for residential use.”
None of Vermont’s congressional delegation has addressed these or other serious issues with any intellectual integrity. Welch has no reference to the F-35 on his website and Sanders has nothing more substantive than links to a few brief news stories.
FORMER PROSECUTOR TRUSTS BELIEF OVER EVIDENCE
“I am concerned that some fears have become exaggerated throughout this debate,” Leahy wrote in December, relying on the unscientific, unsupported opinion of an Air Force officer. In the same letter, without providing a factual basis, the former county prosecutor added, “I would strongly oppose basing the F-35 in Vermont if I believed its noise would make Winooski or South Burlington unlivable.”
One commenter on the POGO Blog story wondered: “When will we bring to justice the flag officers and SESs [senior executive service], past and present, who presided over this abortion? Courts martial, criminal indictments, please? And what about the contractor's violations?"
So while some observers are calling for criminal investigations of a boondoggle, Vermont’s congressional delegation is still calling for basing the plane in Burlington.
[1] http://saveourskiesvt.org/a-letter-from-senator-leahy/
[2] http://www.leahy.senate.gov/search/?q=f-35&x=-944&y=-17&access=p&as_dt=i&as_epq=&as_eq=&as_lq=&as_occt=any&as_oq=&as_q=&as_sitesearch=&client=leahy&sntsp=0&filter=0&getfields=title&lr=&num=15&numgm=3&oe=UTF8&output=xml&partialfields=&proxycustom=&proxyreload=0&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&requiredfields=&site=leahy&sitesearch=&sort=date%3AD%3AS%3Ad1&start=0&ud=1
[3] http://wmswwp10.external.lmco.com/us/news/press-releases/2013/january/130130ae_100th-f-35-in-production.html
[4] http://pogoarchives.org/straus/ote-info-memo-20130215.pdf
[5] http://www.pogo.org/blog/2013/03/20130306-air-forces-f-35a-not-ready-for-combat.html
[6] http://www.businessinsider.com/chief-of-dysfunctional-f-35-program-calls-out-the-pentagons-defense-contractors-2013-2
Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News.
Quote of the Day
"So let me get this straight:- The jet has no lightning protection, the ejection seat may drown the pilot, it's thrust-to-weight ratio has plummeted, its sustained turn performance has been reduced from 5G to 4.5G, 2 of the 3 variants have no gun, none can carry heat-seeking missiles internally, it has poor visibility from the cockpit and pilots struggle to see other aircraft, it has cracks in the engine, it has cracks in its aluminum bulkhead superstructure, its radar doesn't work properly, its helmet mounted sight has a jittery / stuttering display making eye controlled targeting unreliable, its touch-screen sporadically responds, its electro-hydrostatic actuators overheat, its STOVL post-roll actuators overheat, the computer that feeds panoramic display into HMS overheats, its radar causes its nose to glow hot making it very non-stealthy vs enemy jets equipped with FLIR (even the F-22 has been passively detected by Eurofighter's from 50km away with the newest generation FLIR cameras and the F35 is less stealthy than that), its Navy tail-hook doesn't work and still can't land on a carrier as safely as Super Hornets, its stealth skin around the exhaust "peels and bubbles" (reducing rear aspect stealth), its Integrated Power Package fails (one blew up puncturing a nearby fuel tank), its lift-fan (Marine variant) wears out much faster than expected, its fuel dump doesn't work (sprays fuel over the wing reducing stealth & creating a fire hazard upon landing), its EO-DAS has a higher than expected latency, its Night Vision Goggles are worse than some 4.5 Gen jets (20/80 vision vs 20/25 = 3x worse), much higher than expected buffet loads causes huge stress / fatigue to the tail of the jet, automated logistics give false information, it can't use IFF, it can't use aerial refuelling, it can't use the radar to track ground vehicles or ships accurately, it can't take off or land in formation, it can't use real missiles, pilots are not allowed to move the stick or rudder's "too rapidly", and it can't fly supersonic, at night, in the rain or near storms... And this is an "upgrade" to a 1/3rd of the price F-16? Dear God, what a screw-up..."
Tuesday, March 12, 2013
Senator Leahy says F-35 is not what our troops need
This is a portion of a letter a friend just received from Senator Leahy:
"...I have heard from a number of Vermonters who have specifically questioned the value of the F-35. The F-35 program has been poorly managed and is a textbook example of how not to buy military equipment. The causes of the F-35 program's present difficulties are too numerous to detail in my response to your letter; however, I believe the F-35 program is approaching a point where the military services and a majority of Congress will recognize that the jet is just too costly to proceed with purchases at today's planned levels. That recognition may lead to a decision to diversify of our future fighter jet fleet, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps opting to modernize their current fleet of fighter jets and substantially reduce the total number of F-35s that they plan to buy. I do not believe, because of the huge sums taxpayers have already invested and because the F-35 is our only next-generation aircraft presently in development, that a majority of Congress or military leaders will support terminating the program entirely.
I have pushed and continue to push for a better approach to buying military equipment. I don't think "one size fits all," monolithic, ultra-expensive equipment is what our troops need, but enacting a change to the F-35 program at this stage will require the support of a majority of members of Congress. Please know that I am working to find savings in this program and elsewhere in the Pentagon budget to reinvest that money in other critical areas..."
This is the first time any of the VT reps have spoken this accurately about the F-35 program and Leahy is obviously the King of the Delegation . It is going to be seriously hard for the Senator to stick to the "best for our boys" narrative now that this cat is out of the bag. How can you argue that VTANG "deserves" a program that is "a textbook example of how not to buy military equipment" and whose " present difficulties are too numerous to detail" to say nothing of this barn burner:
"I don't think "one size fits all," monolithic, ultra-expensive equipment is what our troops need."
Wow. I'm agog. Game changer.
"...I have heard from a number of Vermonters who have specifically questioned the value of the F-35. The F-35 program has been poorly managed and is a textbook example of how not to buy military equipment. The causes of the F-35 program's present difficulties are too numerous to detail in my response to your letter; however, I believe the F-35 program is approaching a point where the military services and a majority of Congress will recognize that the jet is just too costly to proceed with purchases at today's planned levels. That recognition may lead to a decision to diversify of our future fighter jet fleet, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps opting to modernize their current fleet of fighter jets and substantially reduce the total number of F-35s that they plan to buy. I do not believe, because of the huge sums taxpayers have already invested and because the F-35 is our only next-generation aircraft presently in development, that a majority of Congress or military leaders will support terminating the program entirely.
I have pushed and continue to push for a better approach to buying military equipment. I don't think "one size fits all," monolithic, ultra-expensive equipment is what our troops need, but enacting a change to the F-35 program at this stage will require the support of a majority of members of Congress. Please know that I am working to find savings in this program and elsewhere in the Pentagon budget to reinvest that money in other critical areas..."
This is the first time any of the VT reps have spoken this accurately about the F-35 program and Leahy is obviously the King of the Delegation . It is going to be seriously hard for the Senator to stick to the "best for our boys" narrative now that this cat is out of the bag. How can you argue that VTANG "deserves" a program that is "a textbook example of how not to buy military equipment" and whose " present difficulties are too numerous to detail" to say nothing of this barn burner:
"I don't think "one size fits all," monolithic, ultra-expensive equipment is what our troops need."
Wow. I'm agog. Game changer.
Wednesday, March 6, 2013
The Air Force's F-35A: Not Ready for Combat, Not Even Ready for Combat Training.
By Winslow Wheeler
On February 15, 2013 the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) sent a memorandum and accompanying evaluation report to Congress and the DOD hierarchy describing the performance of the F-35A and its support infrastructure at Eglin Air Force Base (FL). There, already skilled Air Force pilots are undergoing a basic syllabus of familiarization training with the aircraft. Not previously in the public domain, the unclassified DOT&E materials are available at the POGO website at http://pogoarchives.org/straus/ote-info-memo-20130215.pdf.
DOT&E's report, titled "F-35A Joint Strike Fighter: Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation," reveals yet more disappointments on the status and performance of the F-35. The Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) is particularly valuable as it focuses on the Air Force's A model of the F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter." Many in the political and think tank world have focused more on the Marine Corps B, or Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL), version or the Navy's C model with its heavier structure and larger wings. While the B and C are even more expensive and lower in performance-on certain key performance dimensions-than the Air Force's A model, this OUE (inadvertently) demonstrates that the A model is also flawed beyond redemption.
While the DOT&E paperwork includes an opening memo and an executive summary, they do not do justice to the detailed findings of the report. Specific issues are discussed below-much of it in quotations and showing the appropriate page number of the text of the evaluation.
RESTRICTIONS IN SOFTWARE, SYSTEMS AND FLIGHT
The currently available software essential to control the aircraft (software Blocks 1A and 1B) is "intended to provide only basic pilot training and has no combat capability. The current aircraft have a number of significant operational restrictions . such as limited maneuvering, speeds, and constrained descent rates; no carriage of weapons, no use of countermeasures, and no opening of weapons bay doors in flight." (p. 1.) Also, ". student pilots were limited in flight maneuvering to very basic aircraft handling, such as simple turns, climbs, and descents as the flight envelope of speed and altitude was limited, angle-of-attack and g-loading were restricted, and maneuvers normally flown during a familiarization phase of a syllabus were explicitly prohibited." (p. 2.)
Table 3-1 (starting on p. 14.) outlines the many limitations. The following are prohibited:
· Descent rates more than 6,000 feet per minute (for reference, Wikipedia shows the F-16C rate of climb to be 50,000 feet per minute);
· Airspeed above 550 knots per hour or Mach 0.9 (not the 1.6 Mach or 1,200 mph Wikipedia says the F-35 is capable of);
· Angle-of-attack (attitude of flight) beyond -5 and +18 degrees (e.g. not the +50 degrees the aircraft is capable of);
· Maneuvering at more than -1 or +5 gs (nowhere near the stated +9g capability);
· Take offs or landings in formation;
· Flying at night or in weather;
· Using real or simulated weapons;
· Rapid stick or rudder movements;
· Air-to-air or air-to-ground tracking maneuvers;
· Refueling in the air;
· Flying within 25 miles of lightning;
· Use of electronic countermeasures;
· Use of anti-jamming, secure communications, or datalink systems;
· Electro-optical targeting;
· Using the Distributed Aperture System of sensors to detect targets or threats;
· Using the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator;
· Using the helmet mounted display system as a "primary reference;"
· Use of air-to-air or air-to-ground radar modes for electronic attack, sea search, ground-moving targets or close-in air combat modes. (pp. 14-16.)
In addition, ".the radar system exhibited shortfalls that - if not corrected - may significantly degrade the ability to train and fly safely under a typical transition training syllabus, where an operational radar is required. The radar performance shortfalls ranged from the radar being completely inoperative on two sorties to failing to display targets on one sortie, inexplicably dropping targets on another sortie, and taking excessive time to develop a track on near co-speed targets on yet another sortie." (p. 13.)
"AFT VISIBILITY WILL GET THE PILOT GUNNED EVERY TIME"
A key system of the aircraft, the pilot's multi-million dollar helmet-mounted display (HMD) of the aircraft's operating systems, threats, targets and other information "functioned more or less adequately. [but] presented frequent problems for the pilots." These included "misalignment of the virtual horizon display with the actual horizon, inoperative or flickering displays, and focal problems - where the pilot would have either blurry or 'double vision' in the display. The pilots also mentioned problems with stability, jitter, latency, and brightness of the presentation in the helmet display.." Two of the complaints were basically that elements of the helmet made it harder, not easier, to see outside the aircraft. (pp. 16-17.)
There are additional problems for detecting threats in the all-important visual mode: the ejection seat headrest and canopy "bow" (where the canopy meets the fuselage) are designed in such a way as to impede seeing aircraft to the rear: one pilot commented "A pilot will find it nearly impossible to check [their six o'clock position{to the rear}] under g." Another commented, "The head rest is too large and will impede aft visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements," and "Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned [down] every time," referring to close-range combat. (p. 18.)
Indeed, DOT&E stated explicitly "The out-of-cockpit visibility in the F-35 is less than other Air Force fighter aircraft." (p. 17.)
To summarize in different words, the helmet-mounted display and the F-35 system does not present an enhanced, clearer view of the outside world, targets and threats to the pilot; instead, they present a distorted and/or obstructed view. This is one of the most serious backward steps that the entire F-35 system takes, and it presents an even greater threat to the survivability of the F-35 and its pilot than the astounding evidence of the flammability of the F-35 (all versions) in the recent analysis of another DOT&E report by military analyst Lee Gaillard at Counterpunch at http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/04/when-money-is-no-object-the-strange-saga-of-the-f-35/.
In the event of the pilot needing to escape from the aircraft, there are also some incompletely explained problems with the ejection seat in "off-normal" situations, i.e. those that can occur in combat or even real training. (p. 43.)
"SUSTAINMENT"
While there is little that is more important than pilot and aircraft survivability, additional, almost-as stunning revelations about the F-35A involved its "sustainment"-or reliability, maintainability, and availability.
While the report states "Sustainment of the six Block 1A F-35A aircraft was sufficient to meet the student training sortie requirements of the syllabus" (p. ii.), it further explains that this was despite "generous" Air Force resources and a "hybrid of government and contractor support personnel that relies heavily on workaround procedures, non-standard support procedure, and specialized support equipment to generate sorties and maintain the F-35A fleet.." (p. iv).
Moreover, "the program is not meeting reliability growth targets.." That is to say, it is not as reliable as it should be for this stage of its development. (pp. iv and 27) It is also important to note that this was despite the aircraft lacking many mission systems "which resulted in far fewer failure modes and a narrower scope of demand on the supply chain" than would a combat capable aircraft. (In other words, had more of the F-35's complex components and systems been available for use, the aircraft would have required still more maintenance, with the commensurate, additional loss of reliability and availability. [p. 27])
The as is sustainment numbers were not impressive.
The F-35 program required an air abort rate no greater than 1,000 aborts per 100,000 flight hours to commence F-35A training (p. 27): while they were previously even higher, in late 2012-well after the training started-the aircraft had an air abort rate of 3,600 air aborts per 100,000 flying hours. (p. 28)
Mission aborts while the plane is still on the ground (ground aborts) were also a serious problem: one in seven sortie attempts resulted in a ground abort. (p. 28)
The Air Force wanted the F-35As at Eglin AFB to be available for training missions 33 percent of the time: the equivalent of each aircraft flying one sortie every three days. (pp. 29, 30) By late 2012 this very modest minimum was basically being achieved (p. 29), but certain aircraft at various times during the OUE flew as seldom as one sortie every 7 to 10 days. (pp. 30, 31)
Mean Flight Hours Between Critical Failures (a typical measure of reliability) occurred every four hours, on average-well short of the expected 11 hours at this stage of the F-35's development-and well below the aircraft's ultimate goal of a modest 20 hours. (p. 34) The F-35As at Eglin also failed reliability goals for this stage of development: a major problem was the poor reliability of the complicated, badly performing helmet. (p. 34)
Similar problems occurred on the maintenance time the aircraft required. (pp. 36, 37) For example, the mean elapsed time for an engine removal and installation was 52 hours; the system threshold is 120 minutes. (p. 37)
The aircraft's Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) was limited and required workarounds throughout the operating cycle (p. 38), and it has potential problems in hot weather when air conditioning is not available, which would cause ALIS to shut down altogether. The system was also cumbersome and time consuming. (pp. 39-41)
CONCLUSION
DOT&E's report, titled "F-35A Joint Strike Fighter: Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation," reveals yet more disappointments on the status and performance of the F-35. The Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) is particularly valuable as it focuses on the Air Force's A model of the F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter." Many in the political and think tank world have focused more on the Marine Corps B, or Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL), version or the Navy's C model with its heavier structure and larger wings. While the B and C are even more expensive and lower in performance-on certain key performance dimensions-than the Air Force's A model, this OUE (inadvertently) demonstrates that the A model is also flawed beyond redemption.
While the DOT&E paperwork includes an opening memo and an executive summary, they do not do justice to the detailed findings of the report. Specific issues are discussed below-much of it in quotations and showing the appropriate page number of the text of the evaluation.
RESTRICTIONS IN SOFTWARE, SYSTEMS AND FLIGHT
The currently available software essential to control the aircraft (software Blocks 1A and 1B) is "intended to provide only basic pilot training and has no combat capability. The current aircraft have a number of significant operational restrictions . such as limited maneuvering, speeds, and constrained descent rates; no carriage of weapons, no use of countermeasures, and no opening of weapons bay doors in flight." (p. 1.) Also, ". student pilots were limited in flight maneuvering to very basic aircraft handling, such as simple turns, climbs, and descents as the flight envelope of speed and altitude was limited, angle-of-attack and g-loading were restricted, and maneuvers normally flown during a familiarization phase of a syllabus were explicitly prohibited." (p. 2.)
Table 3-1 (starting on p. 14.) outlines the many limitations. The following are prohibited:
· Descent rates more than 6,000 feet per minute (for reference, Wikipedia shows the F-16C rate of climb to be 50,000 feet per minute);
· Airspeed above 550 knots per hour or Mach 0.9 (not the 1.6 Mach or 1,200 mph Wikipedia says the F-35 is capable of);
· Angle-of-attack (attitude of flight) beyond -5 and +18 degrees (e.g. not the +50 degrees the aircraft is capable of);
· Maneuvering at more than -1 or +5 gs (nowhere near the stated +9g capability);
· Take offs or landings in formation;
· Flying at night or in weather;
· Using real or simulated weapons;
· Rapid stick or rudder movements;
· Air-to-air or air-to-ground tracking maneuvers;
· Refueling in the air;
· Flying within 25 miles of lightning;
· Use of electronic countermeasures;
· Use of anti-jamming, secure communications, or datalink systems;
· Electro-optical targeting;
· Using the Distributed Aperture System of sensors to detect targets or threats;
· Using the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator;
· Using the helmet mounted display system as a "primary reference;"
· Use of air-to-air or air-to-ground radar modes for electronic attack, sea search, ground-moving targets or close-in air combat modes. (pp. 14-16.)
In addition, ".the radar system exhibited shortfalls that - if not corrected - may significantly degrade the ability to train and fly safely under a typical transition training syllabus, where an operational radar is required. The radar performance shortfalls ranged from the radar being completely inoperative on two sorties to failing to display targets on one sortie, inexplicably dropping targets on another sortie, and taking excessive time to develop a track on near co-speed targets on yet another sortie." (p. 13.)
"AFT VISIBILITY WILL GET THE PILOT GUNNED EVERY TIME"
A key system of the aircraft, the pilot's multi-million dollar helmet-mounted display (HMD) of the aircraft's operating systems, threats, targets and other information "functioned more or less adequately. [but] presented frequent problems for the pilots." These included "misalignment of the virtual horizon display with the actual horizon, inoperative or flickering displays, and focal problems - where the pilot would have either blurry or 'double vision' in the display. The pilots also mentioned problems with stability, jitter, latency, and brightness of the presentation in the helmet display.." Two of the complaints were basically that elements of the helmet made it harder, not easier, to see outside the aircraft. (pp. 16-17.)
There are additional problems for detecting threats in the all-important visual mode: the ejection seat headrest and canopy "bow" (where the canopy meets the fuselage) are designed in such a way as to impede seeing aircraft to the rear: one pilot commented "A pilot will find it nearly impossible to check [their six o'clock position{to the rear}] under g." Another commented, "The head rest is too large and will impede aft visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements," and "Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned [down] every time," referring to close-range combat. (p. 18.)
Indeed, DOT&E stated explicitly "The out-of-cockpit visibility in the F-35 is less than other Air Force fighter aircraft." (p. 17.)
To summarize in different words, the helmet-mounted display and the F-35 system does not present an enhanced, clearer view of the outside world, targets and threats to the pilot; instead, they present a distorted and/or obstructed view. This is one of the most serious backward steps that the entire F-35 system takes, and it presents an even greater threat to the survivability of the F-35 and its pilot than the astounding evidence of the flammability of the F-35 (all versions) in the recent analysis of another DOT&E report by military analyst Lee Gaillard at Counterpunch at http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/04/when-money-is-no-object-the-strange-saga-of-the-f-35/.
In the event of the pilot needing to escape from the aircraft, there are also some incompletely explained problems with the ejection seat in "off-normal" situations, i.e. those that can occur in combat or even real training. (p. 43.)
"SUSTAINMENT"
While there is little that is more important than pilot and aircraft survivability, additional, almost-as stunning revelations about the F-35A involved its "sustainment"-or reliability, maintainability, and availability.
While the report states "Sustainment of the six Block 1A F-35A aircraft was sufficient to meet the student training sortie requirements of the syllabus" (p. ii.), it further explains that this was despite "generous" Air Force resources and a "hybrid of government and contractor support personnel that relies heavily on workaround procedures, non-standard support procedure, and specialized support equipment to generate sorties and maintain the F-35A fleet.." (p. iv).
Moreover, "the program is not meeting reliability growth targets.." That is to say, it is not as reliable as it should be for this stage of its development. (pp. iv and 27) It is also important to note that this was despite the aircraft lacking many mission systems "which resulted in far fewer failure modes and a narrower scope of demand on the supply chain" than would a combat capable aircraft. (In other words, had more of the F-35's complex components and systems been available for use, the aircraft would have required still more maintenance, with the commensurate, additional loss of reliability and availability. [p. 27])
The as is sustainment numbers were not impressive.
The F-35 program required an air abort rate no greater than 1,000 aborts per 100,000 flight hours to commence F-35A training (p. 27): while they were previously even higher, in late 2012-well after the training started-the aircraft had an air abort rate of 3,600 air aborts per 100,000 flying hours. (p. 28)
Mission aborts while the plane is still on the ground (ground aborts) were also a serious problem: one in seven sortie attempts resulted in a ground abort. (p. 28)
The Air Force wanted the F-35As at Eglin AFB to be available for training missions 33 percent of the time: the equivalent of each aircraft flying one sortie every three days. (pp. 29, 30) By late 2012 this very modest minimum was basically being achieved (p. 29), but certain aircraft at various times during the OUE flew as seldom as one sortie every 7 to 10 days. (pp. 30, 31)
Mean Flight Hours Between Critical Failures (a typical measure of reliability) occurred every four hours, on average-well short of the expected 11 hours at this stage of the F-35's development-and well below the aircraft's ultimate goal of a modest 20 hours. (p. 34) The F-35As at Eglin also failed reliability goals for this stage of development: a major problem was the poor reliability of the complicated, badly performing helmet. (p. 34)
Similar problems occurred on the maintenance time the aircraft required. (pp. 36, 37) For example, the mean elapsed time for an engine removal and installation was 52 hours; the system threshold is 120 minutes. (p. 37)
The aircraft's Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) was limited and required workarounds throughout the operating cycle (p. 38), and it has potential problems in hot weather when air conditioning is not available, which would cause ALIS to shut down altogether. The system was also cumbersome and time consuming. (pp. 39-41)
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is obvious: The F-35A is not viable.
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
When Money is No Object: the Strange Saga of the F-35
by LEE GAILLARD
On 14 January, very shortly after the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) released its 2012 annual report on progress in various Pentagon programs (including a 16-page section on the F-35), Turkey announced a one-year delay in the purchase of its first two Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Why? "High cost yield" and flight and combat capabilities that "are not at the desired level yet". In short, the F-35 doesn't work and it's too expensive. (See GlobalFlight.)
That's just the tip of the iceberg for what is the most expensive military procurement program in history. While some will argue that the key word in the Turkish statement is "yet", one must ask whether Turkey or the United States and all other partner F-35 nations will ever get what they were initially promised.
Several sources (Aviation Week & Space Technology, FlightGlobal, et al.) have provided briefer summaries of the DOT&E's F-35 annual report. But few examine the implications of what the DoD has published, or ask questions that should have been asked years ago.
For its competition against Boeing's X-32, Lockheed Martin built two X-35
prototypes, the first of which flew on 24 October 2000; the first Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) version flew about six years later, on 15 December
2006. Now, over 12 years since that first flight, roughly 65 F-35 airframes have
been delivered-43 of them produced during 2011 and 2012; the 100th
aircraft is now on the assembly line.
Not one is combat capable. Even in training flights they face restrictions.
We are dealing with an aircraft that has been produced and tested in fits and starts, hobbled by a massively expensive and ineffective program of what is euphemistically called "concurrent production" where you build, fly, test, repair, redesign, retrofit, re-test-all at the same time, a process patented by R. Goldberg; money is no object.
Part of the problem is, of course, that Lockheed Martin presented us with two versions of what Detroit would call a 'concept car': a one-off only superficially representative design smaller and lighter than the actual fighter of which it was supposed to be a working prototype. The X-35A flew only 27 test flights in the one-month period before its test regimen ended on November 22; the X-35B (converted from the -A) flew 48.9 hours of tests in 66 flights during the roughly six weeks from June 23 to August 6, 2001. And the -C variant's test regime lasted less than a month-from February 12 to March 10, 2001: 73 test flights totaling 58 hours (including 250 carrier-type landings on the runway at Patuxent River; no mention of how successful the arresting hook turned out to be). For the most part, then, test sequences of roughly one month with flights averaging less than an hour each.
Under those conditions, what kind of 'wring-out' testing could these two aircraft do that would reveal future problems with transonic buffet, wing roll off, and the other significant issues that appeared from the start during testing of LRIP aircraft? Thus, when the Pentagon signed on the dotted line for the first lot of LRIP F-35s, it was buying an untested, larger, heavier paper design that hugely increased risks in any 'concurrent production' program. We are now facing the consequences.
For all F-35 versions, according to the DOT&E report, the pilot's
helmet-mounted display system doesn't work; the F-35C is not yet
carrier-qualified because the tail hook didn't work, had to be redesigned, and
only now is being re-tested; the ejection seat in all models would put pilots at
serious risk in any non-level flight mode above 500 knots (i.e., most dogfight
scenarios); since flight control software is itself still under development, the
computerized flight control system lacks crucial intended capabilities; key
structural components have cracked and require redesign. The list goes on. Yet
Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth plant keeps churning out F-35s in all their
defective glory. And those aircraft already produced now need retrofits of
software and flight critical hardware.
Let's take a closer look.
Structural Problems
In the recently released DOT&E report on 2012 F-35 testing and development, we observe that:
Some obvious questions:
Performance-where the chickens come home to roost. The intended performance envelope for the F-35 is, roughly speaking: altitude capability of 50,000 feet; 700 kts./Mach 1.6 airspeed; maximum g rating of 9.0 (-A), 7.0 (-B), 7.5 (-C) ; turn performance of 5.3 sustained g's (-A), 5.0 sustained g's (-B), and 5.1 sustained g's (-C); acceleration from Mach O.8 to Mach 1.2 intended to be within 65 seconds (See Aviation Week.); angle of attack (AoA) capability to 50 degrees.
At the moment, however, this all seems wishful thinking. Undeveloped software, combined with disappointing results in real-world flight tests ("results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations" (30) ) have triggered flight restrictions and rolled back overly optimistic Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). For these and a variety of conditions that should not be occurring, flights are limited to top speeds of 550 (not 700) kts. (38) and altitudes of 39,000 feet (38) rather than 50,000 feet; AoA to be no greater than 18 degrees (vs. 50 degrees).as well as the imposition of other "aircraft operating limitations that are not suitable for combat" (38). KPPs for sustained g's in a turn have been weakened-by 20 percent for the -A (5.3 down to 4.6)(30), by 10 percent for the -B (5.0 down to 4.5) (32), and by 2 percent for the -C (5.1 down to 5.0) (33). Transonic acceleration from Mach 0.8 to M. 1.2 suffers significantly: with the -A version, it takes 8 seconds longer; 16 seconds longer with the -B; and a worrisome 43 seconds longer with the -C.an increase of about two thirds. Although the F-35 is essentially a strike aircraft, acceleration capability could be critical in combat.
Transonic roll-off (where one wing loses lift sooner than the other when a shock wave forms at the top of the wing as the airflow reaches the local speed of sound) and buffet (or shaking of the entire aircraft) as more surfaces form shock waves and boundary layer flow becomes turbulent-both were more serious than expected in the -B and -C versions, especially with the latter, whose wingspan is greater than that of the other variants: another possible problem in a combat situation.
Some fighter pilots offered their comments on FlightGlobal: " 'What an embarrassment, and there will be obvious tactical implications,' another highly experienced fighter pilot says. '[It's] certainly not anywhere near the performance of most fourth and fifth-generation aircraft.
'At higher altitudes, the reduced performance will directly impact survivability against advanced Russian-designed "double-digit" surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Almaz-Antey S-300PMU2 (also called the SA-20 Gargoyle by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the pilot says. At lower altitudes, where fighters might operate in the close air support or forward air control role, the reduced airframe performance will place pilots at increased risk against shorter-range SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery" ( See GlobalFlight).
A few questions:
Why didn't earlier wind tunnel tests and computational fluid dynamic modeling predict problems involved in maintaining intended sustained g's in a turn?
Why was not poor F-35 transonic acceleration also predicted-especially for the F-35C, whose eight feet greater wingspan contributes to the significantly larger Mach Cone (the zone of disturbed air behind the shock wave system generated by an aircraft at supersonic speed) that must be dragged during the transonic regime?
Why was there not greater fuselage application of area rule (that pinched waist so visible on the ubiquitous T-38 supersonic trainer), that brilliant 1950s design breakthrough by aerodynamicist Richard Whitcomb specifically to minimize transonic drag?
For the -B model, the lift fan may have prevented such a waist pinch. But why have this tail wag the dog, mandating that commonality be based on the least aerodynamic of the three variants when fuselage area rule could well have been applied to the -A and -C versions, establishing a common baseline design of improved transonic efficiency and performance across the 2243 aircraft intended (in current projections) for the Air Force and the Navy-plus all international customers not intending to order the specialized STOVL version that will be produced in the smallest numbers? Pinched-waist commonality would seem to make sense for the vast portion of the fleet numbering more than four times the 540 -B variants tentatively listed for the Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. As it is, given unique differences in wingspan and arresting gear requirements and STOVL mechanical provisions, each version already differs from the other two versions. Commonality? But applying area rule to 75 per cent of F-35s produced would have added commonality where it is most needed, cutting transonic acceleration time while improving combat efficiency, range, and speed.
Weapons and Guidance Glitches
Most weapons tested for compatibility and safe release have worked so far, but under 1-g conditions in level flight. Have possible wind tunnel-based concerns about post-release unstable airflow around wing and fuselage attachment locations prevented more combat-realistic testing under higher g's and in banking or diving modes?
Then there's the high-tech computer-linked helmet-mounted display system that will control these weapons (already in use with other aircraft and in other air forces)-classified as "deficient". Doesn't work. Why? "Expected capabilities that were not delivered" (35) include latency problems with the distributed aperture system (DAS) in the helmet-mounted video display. Latency-some call it 'transport time'-is the time between aircraft sensors' signal acquisition and its transmission and projection in readable format on the pilot's helmet video display. Currently at .133 seconds, that time delay of over an eighth of a second then has to be added to the pilot's additional physical response time of about .15 seconds if he or she is to react to the data displayed and launch a weapon. In dogfights with closing speeds of over 1000 knots, this cumulative delay of more than a quarter of a second can be potentially fatal, and the latency-derived .133 second margin of error in initial aim point stands as an unacceptable contributor to this dangerous combat deficiency. Then add in deficient "night vision acuity," excessive jitter that degrades data and images, inconsistent bore sight alignment, distracting "green glow" seepage from other avionics, imagery and data unable to be recorded (35). So-those high-tech air-to-air missiles and guided bombs cannot even be launched.
And the 25mm four-barrel rotating cannon with its 180 shells? Intended only for the Air Force F-35A version; -B and -C versions have no cannon, but will require external gun pods mounted by ground crews. Why did F-35 designers intentionally ignore the F-4 dogfighting débacle in Vietnam? The F-4-with no internal cannon and radar-guided Sparrow missiles that did not work at short range-could not shoot down the MiG-17s and MiG-21s thrown against them. Gun pods then provided a poor interim solution before the F-4E was redesigned to carry an internal 20mm cannon.
Now we have the F-35-"F" for its "Fighter" role, although it seems primarily an expensive attempt to replace early model F/A-18s and the Marines' subsonic AV-8B Harrier II STOVL aircraft in their ground attack roles. (Ironically, what Hussein's tank crews feared most was the A-10 Warthog with its GAU-8/A Avenger seven-barrel 30mm cannon, which tore them to bits from above, where their armor was thinnest.)
Why, then, in the DOT&E report are there no results listed from airborne firing tests of the F-35A's cannon? If there have not yet been such tests, has a qualifying 25mm shell even been chosen? (We remember what inappropriate propellant selection did to M-16 rifle performance in Vietnam.) Such testing early on will be crucial in determining the effect of recoil shock on the aircraft's structure and engine operation. Not to mention effects of the muzzle blast and combustion gasses on adjacent stealth coatings given that heat from air friction and radiational heating from the afterburner seemed to do such a job on the skin and coatings of the horizontal stabilizers.
No discussion. So-cannon not tested and other external and internally carried weapons for all practical purposes unlaunchable because of "deficient" sighting system available to pilots, thus rendering all F-35s produced so far as little more than expensive aerial targets for their adversaries.
Vulnerability Increased, Combat Survivability Jeopardized
That the F-35B's lift fan system remains untested against live fire while in operation (when its rotating blades would be most failure prone) is probably irrelevant since AV-8B Harrier II-type vertical landings on unprepared surfaces just behind front lines will be problematic at best and even downright dangerous for the F-35B. Despite best USMC intentions regarding close air support and the F-35B's specialized STOVL capabilities, discussions had already begun three years ago on ways to "limit heat damage to carrier decks and other surfaces," very possibly leading to "severe F-35 operating restrictions and or costly facility upgrades, repairs or both" (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/07/19/jsf-heat-woes-being-fixed-trautman/). Indeed, Bill Sweetman (in his Ares blog for Aviation Week) quotes from a Navy report issued in January of 2010 which "outlines what base-construction engineers need to do to ensure that the F-35B's exhaust does not turn the surface it lands on into an area-denial weapon. And it's not trivial. Vertical-landing 'pads will be exposed to 1700 deg. F and high velocity (Mach 1) exhaust,' the report says. The exhaust will melt asphalt and 'is likely to spall the surface of standard airfield concrete pavements on the first VL.' (The report leaves to the imagination what jagged chunks of spalled concrete will do in a supersonic blast field.)" Heat-resistant reinforced concrete, special sealants.the list goes on. And what about that unprepared field, where debris thrown up and sucked into the intakes as the F-35B touches down causes incapacitating foreign object damage (FOD) to the aircraft's engine? And what would be long-term effects on carrier decks? Not a pleasant scenario. Discussion of these problems-and their solutions-do not appear in the 2012 DOT&E report.
F-35C: Carrier Capabilities in Jeopardy
Carrier capability is currently nonexistent: the F-35C is therefore unable to perform carrier-based missions for which it was designed.
In a nutshell, the software just isn't ready. We're no longer climbing into P-51s. Since at least the F-16, software has been absolutely essential for onboard computer systems that maintain stability of fly-by-wire aircraft whose design intentionally places them on the thin edge of instability to permit almost instantaneous change in flight path-crucial in a high-speed dogfight or in avoiding a SAM. Without such computers and software, pilots cannot control the aircraft.
Now take the F-35 and all its automated functions-from helmet-cued weapon sighting to datalink sensor transmissions to other aircraft and.the list goes on. It is said that the F-22 Raptor, the F-35's older brother, has 2.2 million lines of computer code; a recent estimate for the F-35's Block 3 (combat capable) mission systems software postulates that the aircraft's own computers will harbor approximately 8.6 million lines of software code-not counting even higher requirements in related ground systems. Yet "Block 3i software, required for delivery of Lot 6 aircraft and hosted on an upgraded processor, has lagged in integration and laboratory testing" (34). Block 2B software is what is required for only the most basic "initial, limited combat capability for selected internal weapons (AIM-120C, GBU-32/31, and GBU-12)" (34), yet DOT&E admits that "the program made virtually no progress in the development, integration, and laboratory testing of any software beyond 2B" (author emphasis; 34)-i.e., no tangible progress toward anything resembling real combat capability. In the wishful thinking department, full combat System Design and Development capability is tentatively scheduled for Block 3F software to be installed starting with production Lot 9 (34), which means on airframe number 214 at the earliest.possibly sometime in 2017. As for that Block 3i software, those Lot 6 aircraft are already on the assembly line (starting with airframe number 96); while delivery may begin in 2014, don't hold your breath: given program history to date, this mission software may well not be ready and Lot 6 aircraft will be in danger of being undeployable-not much better than 'hangar queens' so often grounded for other glitches. (Will Turkey have waited long enough?)
How bad is it? It's all summarized in that Pentagon report: "Flight restrictions blocked accomplishment of a portion of the planned baseline test points until a new version of vehicle systems software became available" (33). And when it comes to internal weapons release and guidance, "basic mission systems capabilities, such as communications, navigation, and basic radar functions" (34), and more-fully coded software is essential. Yet aircraft are being delivered with major variances that defer testing and add "a bow wave of test points that will have to be completed in the future" (34), while such regressive testing of systems that should have been tested earlier but were forced to be deferred massively complicates any results-based linear (not concurrent) testing and development program. At the time of the report's release, even the minimal capability of Block 1 software included in delivered aircraft was deficient by 20 percent (34). Block 2A software was delivered to flight test four months late and 50 percent deficient (34). Let the report speak for itself: "Testing needed for completion of the remaining 20 percent of Block 1 capabilities and 50 percent of Block 2A capabilities will have to be conducted while the program is introducing Block 2B software to flight test. Software integration tasks supporting Block 2B (and later increments) were delayed in 2012 as contractor software integration staff were needed to support Block 2A development, test, and anomaly resolution" (35). So much for any attempt to install mission and flight control software in any logical sequence where later and more complex versions can build on a foundation of previously installed systems. And that's just a small sampling. Sounds like absolute chaos.
Who is the supervisor for software development? For software integration? Why haven't they been replaced?
Better yet, why hasn't software development and integration, at this point, been transferred to a different vendor?
These seem to be some basic questions that no one is asking.
Equally depressing news has appeared in previous Pentagon annual reports on the F-35, and surely these reports have been distributed to members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
Why have they taken no action regarding the mismanagement of the most massive and expensive military procurement program in our history?
More important, when will they start to do so?
Lee Gaillard holds degrees from Yale University and Middlebury College. He served in the Marine Corps Reserve, worked in publishing for Time-Life International in New York, in industry as a senior product marketing specialist for the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductor assembly equipment, and in secondary education as teacher, department head, and school administrator. In 2002, Gaillard attended the Royal Institute of International Affairs defense conference in London, U.K.: "Europe and America: A New Strategic Partnership," subsequently writing two related articles that appeared in Defense News. After Airways Magazine (July 2005) published his examination of the National Transportation Safety Board's flawed investigation of the American Airlines Flight 587 disaster, he served as a consultant to "Airline Cracks," a documentary on load-bearing composite structures in commercial jetliners, telecast by ITV-West (Bristol, U.K.) on Oct. 4, 2005. In 2006, the Center for Defense Information published his monograph on the V-22 Osprey.
Gaillard has been writing about aviation and defense issues for over 25 years. His more than 100 articles and book reviews have appeared in newspapers, professional journals, and magazines around the country-on topics ranging from the role of luck in the Battle of Midway (Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS) to "Submarine Design: Aeroengineering Dimensions" (Submarine Review) and the V-22 Osprey's readiness for combat (Jane's Defence Weekly). He is listed in recent editions of Who's Who in America and is a contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project.
On 14 January, very shortly after the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) released its 2012 annual report on progress in various Pentagon programs (including a 16-page section on the F-35), Turkey announced a one-year delay in the purchase of its first two Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Why? "High cost yield" and flight and combat capabilities that "are not at the desired level yet". In short, the F-35 doesn't work and it's too expensive. (See GlobalFlight.)
That's just the tip of the iceberg for what is the most expensive military procurement program in history. While some will argue that the key word in the Turkish statement is "yet", one must ask whether Turkey or the United States and all other partner F-35 nations will ever get what they were initially promised.
Several sources (Aviation Week & Space Technology, FlightGlobal, et al.) have provided briefer summaries of the DOT&E's F-35 annual report. But few examine the implications of what the DoD has published, or ask questions that should have been asked years ago.
Not one is combat capable. Even in training flights they face restrictions.
We are dealing with an aircraft that has been produced and tested in fits and starts, hobbled by a massively expensive and ineffective program of what is euphemistically called "concurrent production" where you build, fly, test, repair, redesign, retrofit, re-test-all at the same time, a process patented by R. Goldberg; money is no object.
Part of the problem is, of course, that Lockheed Martin presented us with two versions of what Detroit would call a 'concept car': a one-off only superficially representative design smaller and lighter than the actual fighter of which it was supposed to be a working prototype. The X-35A flew only 27 test flights in the one-month period before its test regimen ended on November 22; the X-35B (converted from the -A) flew 48.9 hours of tests in 66 flights during the roughly six weeks from June 23 to August 6, 2001. And the -C variant's test regime lasted less than a month-from February 12 to March 10, 2001: 73 test flights totaling 58 hours (including 250 carrier-type landings on the runway at Patuxent River; no mention of how successful the arresting hook turned out to be). For the most part, then, test sequences of roughly one month with flights averaging less than an hour each.
Under those conditions, what kind of 'wring-out' testing could these two aircraft do that would reveal future problems with transonic buffet, wing roll off, and the other significant issues that appeared from the start during testing of LRIP aircraft? Thus, when the Pentagon signed on the dotted line for the first lot of LRIP F-35s, it was buying an untested, larger, heavier paper design that hugely increased risks in any 'concurrent production' program. We are now facing the consequences.
F-35 Lightning in flight.
Let's take a closer look.
Structural Problems
In the recently released DOT&E report on 2012 F-35 testing and development, we observe that:
* High-speed high-altitude flight results in delamination and heat damage to the horizontal stabilizers and their stealth coatings (pages 30, 32, and 33 in the DOT&E report; all further numbers in parentheses refer to this report);All may require redesigning of parts and subsequent added weight (since strengthening weak parts often involves adding mass to the component as part of the redesign) when for two of the F-35 versions there is less than a one-percent weight gain margin left for the entire remaining development process, and only a one percent margin available to the F-35C. "Managing weight growth with such small margins will continue to be a significant program challenge" (32); that's an understatement. Then there's the issue of retrofit to aircraft already delivered and others on the production line. (There are, of course, other structural issues not listed here-such as the drive shaft for the lift fan (31), now undergoing its second redesign, plus damaged door attachments (31), etc., etc.) Trenchant DOT&E observation: "Results of findings from structural testing highlight the risks and costs of concurrent production with development" (37).
* A cracked wing carry-through bulkhead (36) halted durability testing for over a year until it could be analyzed and repaired;
* Weakness in the auxiliary air inlet doors on the -B version led to redesign and retesting and time lost (32);
* A crack was found in a forward rib of the F-35A's right wing root-in addition to the similar crack reported on in the FY11 DOT&E Annual Report (36);
* A crack was found in the right engine thrust mount shear web (37);
* Multiple cracks appeared in the lower fuselage bulkhead flange (37), effectively halting F-35B testing;
* All this in addition to earlier cracks discovered in the -B's right side fuselage support frame as well as under a wing where a pylon and its weapon get attached (37)-and yet another in an internal support structure.
Some obvious questions:
* Why yet another 'spiral development/concurrent production' program when the same kinds of major problems and expenses had appeared years earlier with the V-22 Osprey during whose development 30 Marines were killed? (Not to mention our similar 'concurrent development' fiasco involving the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): as Rear Adm. Tom Rowden wrote recently in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, "In the interest of quick delivery to the fleet, ship design began before requirements were finalized, and building started before designs were stable." No wonder the Navy has conceded that "LCS vessels are only rated for Combat 1+ levels-lower than a tanker" [as quoted by Mike Fabey in Aviation Week's January 28, 2013 Defense Technology Edition]. Pathetic. Reminiscent of the current barely Block 1 training capabilities of the F-35?Performance Shortfall
* What was missing from wind tunnel tests and 3D computer modeling studies of flow, weight, and stress that permitted the cracking found in that wing carry-through bulkhead and other basic structural weaknesses to get through?
* Why weren't two representative pre-production aircraft put through the wringer with several months of test flights to find these areas of stress and their causes before completion of final design and authorization of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)?
Performance-where the chickens come home to roost. The intended performance envelope for the F-35 is, roughly speaking: altitude capability of 50,000 feet; 700 kts./Mach 1.6 airspeed; maximum g rating of 9.0 (-A), 7.0 (-B), 7.5 (-C) ; turn performance of 5.3 sustained g's (-A), 5.0 sustained g's (-B), and 5.1 sustained g's (-C); acceleration from Mach O.8 to Mach 1.2 intended to be within 65 seconds (See Aviation Week.); angle of attack (AoA) capability to 50 degrees.
At the moment, however, this all seems wishful thinking. Undeveloped software, combined with disappointing results in real-world flight tests ("results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations" (30) ) have triggered flight restrictions and rolled back overly optimistic Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). For these and a variety of conditions that should not be occurring, flights are limited to top speeds of 550 (not 700) kts. (38) and altitudes of 39,000 feet (38) rather than 50,000 feet; AoA to be no greater than 18 degrees (vs. 50 degrees).as well as the imposition of other "aircraft operating limitations that are not suitable for combat" (38). KPPs for sustained g's in a turn have been weakened-by 20 percent for the -A (5.3 down to 4.6)(30), by 10 percent for the -B (5.0 down to 4.5) (32), and by 2 percent for the -C (5.1 down to 5.0) (33). Transonic acceleration from Mach 0.8 to M. 1.2 suffers significantly: with the -A version, it takes 8 seconds longer; 16 seconds longer with the -B; and a worrisome 43 seconds longer with the -C.an increase of about two thirds. Although the F-35 is essentially a strike aircraft, acceleration capability could be critical in combat.
Transonic roll-off (where one wing loses lift sooner than the other when a shock wave forms at the top of the wing as the airflow reaches the local speed of sound) and buffet (or shaking of the entire aircraft) as more surfaces form shock waves and boundary layer flow becomes turbulent-both were more serious than expected in the -B and -C versions, especially with the latter, whose wingspan is greater than that of the other variants: another possible problem in a combat situation.
Some fighter pilots offered their comments on FlightGlobal: " 'What an embarrassment, and there will be obvious tactical implications,' another highly experienced fighter pilot says. '[It's] certainly not anywhere near the performance of most fourth and fifth-generation aircraft.
'At higher altitudes, the reduced performance will directly impact survivability against advanced Russian-designed "double-digit" surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Almaz-Antey S-300PMU2 (also called the SA-20 Gargoyle by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the pilot says. At lower altitudes, where fighters might operate in the close air support or forward air control role, the reduced airframe performance will place pilots at increased risk against shorter-range SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery" ( See GlobalFlight).
A few questions:
Why didn't earlier wind tunnel tests and computational fluid dynamic modeling predict problems involved in maintaining intended sustained g's in a turn?
Why was not poor F-35 transonic acceleration also predicted-especially for the F-35C, whose eight feet greater wingspan contributes to the significantly larger Mach Cone (the zone of disturbed air behind the shock wave system generated by an aircraft at supersonic speed) that must be dragged during the transonic regime?
Why was there not greater fuselage application of area rule (that pinched waist so visible on the ubiquitous T-38 supersonic trainer), that brilliant 1950s design breakthrough by aerodynamicist Richard Whitcomb specifically to minimize transonic drag?
For the -B model, the lift fan may have prevented such a waist pinch. But why have this tail wag the dog, mandating that commonality be based on the least aerodynamic of the three variants when fuselage area rule could well have been applied to the -A and -C versions, establishing a common baseline design of improved transonic efficiency and performance across the 2243 aircraft intended (in current projections) for the Air Force and the Navy-plus all international customers not intending to order the specialized STOVL version that will be produced in the smallest numbers? Pinched-waist commonality would seem to make sense for the vast portion of the fleet numbering more than four times the 540 -B variants tentatively listed for the Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. As it is, given unique differences in wingspan and arresting gear requirements and STOVL mechanical provisions, each version already differs from the other two versions. Commonality? But applying area rule to 75 per cent of F-35s produced would have added commonality where it is most needed, cutting transonic acceleration time while improving combat efficiency, range, and speed.
Weapons and Guidance Glitches
Most weapons tested for compatibility and safe release have worked so far, but under 1-g conditions in level flight. Have possible wind tunnel-based concerns about post-release unstable airflow around wing and fuselage attachment locations prevented more combat-realistic testing under higher g's and in banking or diving modes?
Then there's the high-tech computer-linked helmet-mounted display system that will control these weapons (already in use with other aircraft and in other air forces)-classified as "deficient". Doesn't work. Why? "Expected capabilities that were not delivered" (35) include latency problems with the distributed aperture system (DAS) in the helmet-mounted video display. Latency-some call it 'transport time'-is the time between aircraft sensors' signal acquisition and its transmission and projection in readable format on the pilot's helmet video display. Currently at .133 seconds, that time delay of over an eighth of a second then has to be added to the pilot's additional physical response time of about .15 seconds if he or she is to react to the data displayed and launch a weapon. In dogfights with closing speeds of over 1000 knots, this cumulative delay of more than a quarter of a second can be potentially fatal, and the latency-derived .133 second margin of error in initial aim point stands as an unacceptable contributor to this dangerous combat deficiency. Then add in deficient "night vision acuity," excessive jitter that degrades data and images, inconsistent bore sight alignment, distracting "green glow" seepage from other avionics, imagery and data unable to be recorded (35). So-those high-tech air-to-air missiles and guided bombs cannot even be launched.
And the 25mm four-barrel rotating cannon with its 180 shells? Intended only for the Air Force F-35A version; -B and -C versions have no cannon, but will require external gun pods mounted by ground crews. Why did F-35 designers intentionally ignore the F-4 dogfighting débacle in Vietnam? The F-4-with no internal cannon and radar-guided Sparrow missiles that did not work at short range-could not shoot down the MiG-17s and MiG-21s thrown against them. Gun pods then provided a poor interim solution before the F-4E was redesigned to carry an internal 20mm cannon.
Now we have the F-35-"F" for its "Fighter" role, although it seems primarily an expensive attempt to replace early model F/A-18s and the Marines' subsonic AV-8B Harrier II STOVL aircraft in their ground attack roles. (Ironically, what Hussein's tank crews feared most was the A-10 Warthog with its GAU-8/A Avenger seven-barrel 30mm cannon, which tore them to bits from above, where their armor was thinnest.)
Why, then, in the DOT&E report are there no results listed from airborne firing tests of the F-35A's cannon? If there have not yet been such tests, has a qualifying 25mm shell even been chosen? (We remember what inappropriate propellant selection did to M-16 rifle performance in Vietnam.) Such testing early on will be crucial in determining the effect of recoil shock on the aircraft's structure and engine operation. Not to mention effects of the muzzle blast and combustion gasses on adjacent stealth coatings given that heat from air friction and radiational heating from the afterburner seemed to do such a job on the skin and coatings of the horizontal stabilizers.
No discussion. So-cannon not tested and other external and internally carried weapons for all practical purposes unlaunchable because of "deficient" sighting system available to pilots, thus rendering all F-35s produced so far as little more than expensive aerial targets for their adversaries.
Vulnerability Increased, Combat Survivability Jeopardized
* In the live fire test and evaluation, "None of the F-35 variants met the operational requirement for the HEI threat" posed by fragments and damage from a 30mm high explosive incendiary (HEI) shell (41). The Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and the Su-27 and its derivatives (these in service with a number of countries)-and the T-50/PAK-FA shaped for stealth and now in development-all carry 30mm cannon and could be considered potential adversaries for the F-35.?* But, given the F-35's basic design, it's not just 30mm shells that pose a threat: any 20mm, 7.62mm, 5.56mm round from the ground or fragments from the smallest of shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles penetrating the F-35's skin could trigger catastrophic loss of aircraft. The -A and -C variants have massive volumes of fuel surrounding the engine inlets, and the 270-volt electrical system provides ample charge for a fatal spark in the air/fuel mixture. Since the fuel is also being used as a heat sink to cool avionics and other systems (and has considerable trouble doing so on hot summer days), it is already at an elevated temperature. Furthermore, this pre-heated and volatile fuel is being used as the operating liquid in the -B's "fueldraulic system" that swivels the extremely hot engine exhaust nozzle during STOVL mode. (Eaton supplies the VDRP fueldraulic boost pump and the 4000 psi hydraulic power generation system.) What happens when a stray rifle bullet nicks a fueldraulic line and raw fuel sprays at 4000 psi into the broiling engine bay next to the 1500-1700 degree exhaust nozzle??* All F-35 models rely on a highly computerized fly-by-wire flight control system, with primary avionics bays nested in the lower forward fuselage-where they are most susceptible to ground fire. With even one hit to that flight control computer, the pilot immediately loses control of the aircraft and must eject.F-35B: STOVL Missions Raise Risks
*And that poses a further problem: the Air Force found the early LRIP pilot escape system to be a "serious risk" since "interactions between the pilot, the ejection seat, and the canopy during the ejection sequence .are not well understood" (38). So-don't get into a dogfight with MiG-29s or Mirage 2000s or Su-27s or PAK-FAs or any other fighter armed with 30mm cannon, and don't bail out if you survive their cannon fire? (We are reminded of equivalent survivability issues with the MV-22 Osprey, which cannot autotrotate to a safe landing if both engines fail, nor has it ever been tested in a power-out dead-stick landing: its glide ratio is abysmal, its fuselage is brittle (composites), and it has no crew ejection seats; yet it's been in full production for the Marines and the Air Force for several years.)
That the F-35B's lift fan system remains untested against live fire while in operation (when its rotating blades would be most failure prone) is probably irrelevant since AV-8B Harrier II-type vertical landings on unprepared surfaces just behind front lines will be problematic at best and even downright dangerous for the F-35B. Despite best USMC intentions regarding close air support and the F-35B's specialized STOVL capabilities, discussions had already begun three years ago on ways to "limit heat damage to carrier decks and other surfaces," very possibly leading to "severe F-35 operating restrictions and or costly facility upgrades, repairs or both" (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/07/19/jsf-heat-woes-being-fixed-trautman/). Indeed, Bill Sweetman (in his Ares blog for Aviation Week) quotes from a Navy report issued in January of 2010 which "outlines what base-construction engineers need to do to ensure that the F-35B's exhaust does not turn the surface it lands on into an area-denial weapon. And it's not trivial. Vertical-landing 'pads will be exposed to 1700 deg. F and high velocity (Mach 1) exhaust,' the report says. The exhaust will melt asphalt and 'is likely to spall the surface of standard airfield concrete pavements on the first VL.' (The report leaves to the imagination what jagged chunks of spalled concrete will do in a supersonic blast field.)" Heat-resistant reinforced concrete, special sealants.the list goes on. And what about that unprepared field, where debris thrown up and sucked into the intakes as the F-35B touches down causes incapacitating foreign object damage (FOD) to the aircraft's engine? And what would be long-term effects on carrier decks? Not a pleasant scenario. Discussion of these problems-and their solutions-do not appear in the 2012 DOT&E report.
F-35C: Carrier Capabilities in Jeopardy
Carrier capability is currently nonexistent: the F-35C is therefore unable to perform carrier-based missions for which it was designed.
* Arresting hook: not operational-could not catch the cable and had to be entirely redesigned. A basic design issue is that the distance between the F-35C's main landing gear (MLG) and the tail hook is too short, providing insufficient time after passage of the main wheels over the wire for it to bounce up and be snagged by the hook. The new hook, with a sharper point, is now being tested on an arresting cable-equipped runway simulating a carrier deck. Unfortunately, these tests have been less than fully successful. In addition, the situation has now morphed into a systems engineering issue in that a recent study shows "higher than predicted loads" (39) being passed from the hook to the airframe. Will further cracking soon occur in key support frames to which the hook system is attached, requiring additional redesign of basic structure and adding yet more weight?
* Significant carrier landing approach problems: when "30 degrees of flaps are required to meet the KPP for maximum approach speed of 145 knots at required carrier landing weight" (33), poor handling qualities result; a 15-degree flap setting improves handling (33) but raises approach speed above the KPP limit. (And higher touch-down speed will further degrade arresting cable bounce time needed for the arresting hook even as it further increases stress on the aircraft's tail hook mounting points.)
* The need for 43 additional seconds to accelerate from Mach .8 to Mach 1.2 (33), along with more severe transonic buffeting and wing roll off than in the other two variants, suggests that the -C has become essentially a subsonic aircraft in both air-intercept and ground-attack modes.
* Tactical data transfer: doesn't work-pilot cannot transfer video data or crucial recorded mission data to the carrier's intelligence system, and the carrier cannot receive Link 16 datalink imagery transmissions (39).
* Maintenance Repair & Overhaul (MRO) datalink: inoperable-"design of the JSF Prognostic Health Maintenance downlink is incomplete" (39)-as are so many other software-reliant systems. (How do you deliver an aircraft-or more than 65 of them-when basic parts or systems have not yet even been designed?!) Result? An efficient pre-landing prognostic maintenance transmission becomes a lengthy and inefficient post-mission diagnostic analysis. And, as in so many other time-consuming cases with the F-35, once design is complete, more time will have to be wasted in regression testing of the revised system for all versions of this aircraft (see below for further examples).In short, it would seem that the Navy has a 5th-generation 'supersonic' carrier-based strike fighter that struggles in the transonic regime, has significant speed or handling problems during landing approach, is currently equipped with a tail hook that does not work, and-once on board-cannot download crucial mission data or essential maintenance requirements.
* Mission Availability, Reliability, and Maintenance With this Prognostic Health Maintenance datalink inoperable, the degrading of efficient MRO operations has an obvious impact on subsequent aircraft reliability. Meanwhile, concurrent development has forced the incorporation of other unproven and immature subsystems into the overall JSF systems package with predictable results on reliability. Mean flight hours between flight critical failure were 40 percent below expectations for the F-35A, 30 percent below for the F-35B, and 16 percent below for the F-35C (41).
* Corrective measures related to these critical failures? The F-35A's mean corrective maintenance time is 2 to 3 times the period allotted. For the -B, it's 78 percent more than time allowed, and 65 percent over for the -C (42). Massive immaturity of the Joint Technical Data (JTD) maintenance program and the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) require multiple workarounds (42) by the maintenance crew and further compromise aircraft availability, causing frustrating additional operational delays. Indeed, regarding those USMC F-35Bs deployed to Yuma, AZ: "Without a certified and functional ALIS system, the aircraft are essentially inoperable" (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/senior-f-35-official-warns-on-software-breakdowns-relationship-crisis-376590/).It's little surprise that the Air Force's Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) that ran for two months from September through November, 2012, "included no combat capabilities" (27) because the overall system itself was still under development and so immature that "little can be learned about operating and sustaining the F-35 in combat operations from this evaluation" (27). But they did discover the disconcerting impact of the critical failures and maintenance problems listed above:
* Mission availability rate for the F-35A consequently averaged less than 35 percent, "meaning three of nine aircraft were available on average at any given time" (38);
* And for those 'available' aircraft, reports from the field at Eglin indicate that pre-flight prep for the F-35 requires roughly 44-50 maintenance man-hours, close to double the total maintenance man-hours per flight hour for the F-16.
* Despite that extended pre-flight prep, cumulative air abort rates for both the -A and -B variants averaged roughly five aborts per 100 flight hours-despite the "goal of 1.0 air abort per 100 flight hours as a threshold to start an evaluation of the system's readiness for training" (author emphasis; 38). Readiness for combat? Not mentioned.Software: The Noose That's Strangling the F-35
In a nutshell, the software just isn't ready. We're no longer climbing into P-51s. Since at least the F-16, software has been absolutely essential for onboard computer systems that maintain stability of fly-by-wire aircraft whose design intentionally places them on the thin edge of instability to permit almost instantaneous change in flight path-crucial in a high-speed dogfight or in avoiding a SAM. Without such computers and software, pilots cannot control the aircraft.
Now take the F-35 and all its automated functions-from helmet-cued weapon sighting to datalink sensor transmissions to other aircraft and.the list goes on. It is said that the F-22 Raptor, the F-35's older brother, has 2.2 million lines of computer code; a recent estimate for the F-35's Block 3 (combat capable) mission systems software postulates that the aircraft's own computers will harbor approximately 8.6 million lines of software code-not counting even higher requirements in related ground systems. Yet "Block 3i software, required for delivery of Lot 6 aircraft and hosted on an upgraded processor, has lagged in integration and laboratory testing" (34). Block 2B software is what is required for only the most basic "initial, limited combat capability for selected internal weapons (AIM-120C, GBU-32/31, and GBU-12)" (34), yet DOT&E admits that "the program made virtually no progress in the development, integration, and laboratory testing of any software beyond 2B" (author emphasis; 34)-i.e., no tangible progress toward anything resembling real combat capability. In the wishful thinking department, full combat System Design and Development capability is tentatively scheduled for Block 3F software to be installed starting with production Lot 9 (34), which means on airframe number 214 at the earliest.possibly sometime in 2017. As for that Block 3i software, those Lot 6 aircraft are already on the assembly line (starting with airframe number 96); while delivery may begin in 2014, don't hold your breath: given program history to date, this mission software may well not be ready and Lot 6 aircraft will be in danger of being undeployable-not much better than 'hangar queens' so often grounded for other glitches. (Will Turkey have waited long enough?)
How bad is it? It's all summarized in that Pentagon report: "Flight restrictions blocked accomplishment of a portion of the planned baseline test points until a new version of vehicle systems software became available" (33). And when it comes to internal weapons release and guidance, "basic mission systems capabilities, such as communications, navigation, and basic radar functions" (34), and more-fully coded software is essential. Yet aircraft are being delivered with major variances that defer testing and add "a bow wave of test points that will have to be completed in the future" (34), while such regressive testing of systems that should have been tested earlier but were forced to be deferred massively complicates any results-based linear (not concurrent) testing and development program. At the time of the report's release, even the minimal capability of Block 1 software included in delivered aircraft was deficient by 20 percent (34). Block 2A software was delivered to flight test four months late and 50 percent deficient (34). Let the report speak for itself: "Testing needed for completion of the remaining 20 percent of Block 1 capabilities and 50 percent of Block 2A capabilities will have to be conducted while the program is introducing Block 2B software to flight test. Software integration tasks supporting Block 2B (and later increments) were delayed in 2012 as contractor software integration staff were needed to support Block 2A development, test, and anomaly resolution" (35). So much for any attempt to install mission and flight control software in any logical sequence where later and more complex versions can build on a foundation of previously installed systems. And that's just a small sampling. Sounds like absolute chaos.
Who is the supervisor for software development? For software integration? Why haven't they been replaced?
Better yet, why hasn't software development and integration, at this point, been transferred to a different vendor?
These seem to be some basic questions that no one is asking.
Equally depressing news has appeared in previous Pentagon annual reports on the F-35, and surely these reports have been distributed to members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
Why have they taken no action regarding the mismanagement of the most massive and expensive military procurement program in our history?
More important, when will they start to do so?
Lee Gaillard holds degrees from Yale University and Middlebury College. He served in the Marine Corps Reserve, worked in publishing for Time-Life International in New York, in industry as a senior product marketing specialist for the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductor assembly equipment, and in secondary education as teacher, department head, and school administrator. In 2002, Gaillard attended the Royal Institute of International Affairs defense conference in London, U.K.: "Europe and America: A New Strategic Partnership," subsequently writing two related articles that appeared in Defense News. After Airways Magazine (July 2005) published his examination of the National Transportation Safety Board's flawed investigation of the American Airlines Flight 587 disaster, he served as a consultant to "Airline Cracks," a documentary on load-bearing composite structures in commercial jetliners, telecast by ITV-West (Bristol, U.K.) on Oct. 4, 2005. In 2006, the Center for Defense Information published his monograph on the V-22 Osprey.
Gaillard has been writing about aviation and defense issues for over 25 years. His more than 100 articles and book reviews have appeared in newspapers, professional journals, and magazines around the country-on topics ranging from the role of luck in the Battle of Midway (Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS) to "Submarine Design: Aeroengineering Dimensions" (Submarine Review) and the V-22 Osprey's readiness for combat (Jane's Defence Weekly). He is listed in recent editions of Who's Who in America and is a contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project.
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